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Abstract 
Over the last three decades work and employment in the private and public sector are 
increasingly subject to marketisation processes. A defining feature of marketised employment 
is the rise of performance management systems (PMS). This article utilises a novel 
framework of Sayer’s moral economy approach and labour process theory to explore the 
changing nature of bank work and social relationships between branch managers and branch 
workers before and after the implementation of PMSs in UK banks. This article illustrates 
how the social and moral texture of the social relationships between branch workers and their 
managers deteriorated after the implementation of PMS, resulting in the rise of hostile forms 
of engagement.  
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Introduction 
Over the last three decades, work and employment in the private and public sector has been 
increasingly subject to marketisation processes that encapsulate the dependence of firms on 
financial markets and the cascading down of short-term market needs into the firm with 
ample consequences for the quality of work (Thompson, 2013). Indeed, there is a growing 
recognition of a deterioration of job quality in the context of large-scale organisational 
restructuring along market demands, pushing for a reduction of labour costs and closer 
performance monitoring within an intensified labour process (Carré et al., 2012; Carter et al., 
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2014). Ample evidence reveals that performance management systems (PMSs) in routinised 
workplaces embody a particular type of marketised employment, being primarily concerned 
with the ‘full utilisation of employee labour power’ (Thompson, 2011:362) via individualised 
performance targets, tight managerial surveillance and disciplinary policies that implement 
market discipline in the firm (Ellis and Taylor, 2006; Newsome et al., 2013). The impact of 
PMSs on the labour process have been portrayed as particularly radical in white collar 
workplaces that have been traditionally understood as featuring privileged employment 
conditions and informal ties between front-line managers and employees (Halford et al., 
1995; Hassard et al., 2009; Lockwood, 1957). Indeed, under performance driven workplace 
regimes white collar employees and their managers experienced a degradation and 
intensification of their work, leading to rising levels of friction between employees and their 
managers (Carter al al., 2014; Fevre et al., 2012; Taylor, 2013). Yet, empirical evidence that 
combines an in-depth account of the changing white collar labour process under PMSs and its 
impact on the social and moral relationships between employees and managers remain scant.  
Based on qualitative in-depth interviews with branch workers (BWs) and branch 
managers (BMs) from UK banks, the article examines the changing labour process and its 
social and moral relationships between BWs and BMs against the backdrop of the 
transformation of the conservative and bureaucratic workplace regime towards a PMS driven 
employment relationship (Ellis and Taylor, 2010; Halford et al., 1995). The present article is 
based on a novel theoretical framework that combines key aspects of labour process theory 
(LPT) and Andrew Sayer’s moral economy (ME), fusing the strength of the materialist 
workplace theory and its focus on changing work and management practices with a strong 
understanding of human and moral agency. Through the lens of LPT and ME, this article 
reveals that the privileged employment conditions in banks that fostered a social compromise 
and shared moral understandings between employees and their managers before its 
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marketisation became dismantled and replaced with an intensified labour process and 
conflict-ridden relationships under PMS. The article argues further that the theoretical lens of 
LPT and ME offers a holistic frame that combines a critical analysis of trends in work and 
employment with a thick conceptualisation of actors as social and moral beings, paving the 
way for an analysis of the social and relational consequences of work and employment under 
capitalism.  
 
The changing nature of white collar work and relationships between 
managers and employees 
 
Sociological literature on the nature of white collar work and the relationship between 
managers and employees in white collar settings are traditionally embedded in wider debates 
regarding the distinctive class position and privileged employment conditions of clerical 
workers vis-à-vis manual workers (Carter, 1985; Crompton and Jones, 1984). In the first half 
of the twentieth century, the patriarchal employment structure featured high levels of job 
security, incremental pay scales, varying discretion levels at work and modest but stable 
career opportunities for male clerical workers (Crompton, 1989; Lockwood, 1958). Within 
this environment, relationships between clerical workers and their immediate supervisors 
were often characterised by personal ties and trust over informal work effort norms. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between managers and clerical workers was embedded in a 
moral order which was based on a paternalist and unitary ideology that masked the power 
asymmetry in the workplace by a focus on common and shared objectives (Heritage, 1977).  
A widely shared position in labour process research is that from the 1960s onwards 
the implementation of scientific management techniques and ICT in clerical work settings 
triggered waves of downskilling and rationalisation (Braverman, 1974), while the authority 
and discretion of middle and front-line managers (FLM) became constrained by centralised 
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decision-making processes (Carter, 1985). Consequential, middle and FLMs increasingly 
performed supervisory and control functions, resulting in a disconnection of informal ties 
between clerical workers and their managers and rising levels of conflict and instrumental 
forms of engagement between management and labour (Crompton and Jones, 1984). 
Despite the well-documented degradation of clerical work in many workplaces, some 
areas of white collar employment encapsulated a variety of traditional clerical tasks and 
continued to be characterised by relatively privileged employment conditions and more 
informal front-line management-employee relationships. For example, Carter et al.’s ( 2014) 
research on the changing class relations in Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
illustrate that prior to the subsequent implementation of Lean Management (LM) in 2005 the 
relationship between front-line managers (FLM) and employees was characterised by shared 
interests and personal ties in the context of relatively high levels of discretion in the labour 
process. However, Carter and colleagues argue that under LM work became subject to 
standardisation, tighter control and ever increasing performance pressures for managers and 
employees, resulting in a rise of conflict-ridden relationships between FLMs and employees 
(see also Fevre et al., 2012; Hassard et al., 2009).  
Similar observations can be found in the literature on employment relations in the UK 
banking industry. For the majority of the Post-second world war era clearing banks were 
labelled as ‘employing organizations par excellence’ (Gall, 2008:xiv), offering lifetime 
employment and modest but stable career opportunities (Cressey and Scott, 1992; Halford et 
al., 1995). Relationships between bank clerks and their managers are characterised as 
traditionally embedded in an unitary ideology that promoted a moral order, featuring shared 
interest and loyalty (Heritage, 1977). Following on from this, Blackburn (1967:57) among 
others enthusiastically concludes that ‘(b)anking is different from other occupations; in 
banking there is no split between labour and capital; no “us” and “them”’. 
5 
 
Employment conditions and the social relations of production in the banking industry 
transformed radically with the launch of the Financial Service Act (FSA) under the Thatcher 
regime in the late 1980s that resulted in a liberalisation of the financial market (Watson, 
2004). In this environment clearing banks radically restructured the employment relationship 
throughout the nineties, engaging in large scale labour cost cutting that rendered management 
as well as employees vulnerable to layoffs (Cressey and Scott, 1992). Parallel to the 
restructuring banks went through was the redesign of the branch as retail unit that focusses 
primarily on the marketing and selling of financial products to customers (Ellis and Taylor, 
2010). Arguably, this shift reflects the wider development of a financialisation of society that 
pushes for an increasing dependency of households on the financial market ‘as debtors and as 
asset holders’ (Lapavitsas, 2011:612).  Fevre et al. (2012) suggest that as a result of the 
combination of the standardisation of branch work with the replacement of the service culture 
in favourite of a product sales culture, bank workers experienced a violation of their moral 
principles, resulting in rising levels of friction between bank workers and branch managers in 
general and ill-treatment at work in particular.  
While the changing conditions of white collar employment in general and bank work 
in particular are well documented, in-depth accounts of the changing social and moral 
relationships between employees and their managers in the context of the radical 
transformation of the labour process remain scant. Arguably, the neglect of a focus on the 
moral dimensions of employment in critical employment studies reflects the wider ‘divorce 
of the study of morality from [that of] political economy’ (Sayer, 2000: 86) that is embodied 
in the view of economic practices under capitalism as disembedded from the social and moral 
sphere. In order to fuse a strong conceptualisation of human agency and the moral 
dimensions of employment with a critical understanding of changing workplace practices in 
the context of wider shifts in the political economy, the next section combines labour process 
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theory (LPT) with Sayer’s moral economy (ME) approach. This theoretical lens guides the 
exploration of the changing labour process and the social and moral relationships between 
branch workers and their managers in the context of the shift from the conservative 
bureaucracy towards a PMS driven employment relationship.  
 
The moral economy of the labour process  
 
LPT has a rich history of conceptualising the workplace as a contested terrain. Here 
‘struggles over divergent interests and identities’ (Thompson and Newsome, 2004:150) take 
place against the backdrop of the indeterminacy of labour and the structured antagonism of 
the employment relationship (Thompson, 1989). The indeterminacy of labour points towards 
the contingency and variability of labour power and managerial practices that aim via a 
variety of strategies  to deploy and maximise labours work effort  (Smith, 2006). Following 
on from this, the employment relationship is necessarily antagonistic and exploitative as 
labour is a key factor in the production process through which organisations create surplus 
value, while workers do not own the fruits of their labour nor decide how their labour power 
is utilised (P.Edwards, 1986). Hence, conflict is a persistent feature of the relationship 
between management and labour as both groups possess diverging interests regarding 
workplace conditions in general and the utilisation of labour power in particular (Edwards, 
1979:111).  
However, LPT approaches do not suggest that the struggle over interests between 
labour and capital follows a pre-determined pattern, but is rather context dependent and 
shaped by the collective agency of labour and capital (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). 
Fusing LPT insights and wider industrial relation theories, Edwards and colleagues (2006) 
argue that compromise at work reflects dynamic negotiations over control and developmental 
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concerns between labour and management that entail formal and informal bargaining over 
concrete forms of managerial power on the one hand and interests over developmental 
aspects, such as investment in training and technology that affect the quality of jobs on the 
other (Edwards et al., 2006). In this way, ‘the competing rationales of management and 
labour sometimes run in parallel, and sometimes not’ (Bélanger and Edwards, 2007:715). 
Edwards and colleagues provide a rich conceptualisation of the interplay between structuring 
conditions and the formation of compromise and conflict at work in the context of the wider 
inequalities of a political economy. Yet, the relationship between managers and employees is 
theorised as being exclusively of economic nature, driven by rational interests that translate 
into various forms of conflict or compromise at work. Hence, the social and moral 
dimensions of relationships at work between employees and managers that is embodied in the 
interplay of people’s complex needs and concerns as economic, but also social and moral 
beings are neglected. This article argues that fusing Sayer’s moral economy (ME) with LPT 
enhances an understanding of the social relationships between employees and their managers 
as control, social and moral relationship that is shaped by the particularities of workplace 
regimes and people’s complex needs and concerns.   
The concept of moral economy (ME) has a rich heritage of analysing the dialectical 
relationship between economic practices, communities and people in pre-market and 
capitalist societies. One of the most familiar ME accounts comes from Karl Polanyi’s much 
celebrated great transformation thesis. Polanyi suggests that the moral order of pre-market 
societies in which labour and land ‘formed part of the organic structure of society’ (Polanyi, 
1968:35) deteriorated under capitalism and its tendency to subsume communities, people and 
their labour power under market forces. In order to protect society from dehumanisation 
posed by marketisation, Polanyi (1957) famously argued that counter movements, primarily 
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from the state, emerge to constrain market forces via regulatory initiatives and the 
development of a welfare state.  
Marrying a neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy with a radical political economy 
approach that includes Polanyi’s work, Andrew Sayer’s ME concept (2000; 2005; 2011) 
conceptualises economic practices under capitalism as always embedded, even though to 
different degrees, in the social and moral sphere of society and people’s moral sentiments. 
Here, a dialectical relationship between economic actions and people’s morality emerge, 
suggesting that capitalist practices  shape, but also are re-shaped, by webs of norms and 
values of humanity, affecting and being affected by human evaluations and people’s moral 
sentiments (Sayer, 2000). Rejecting the tendency in social sciences to reduce morality to 
prevalent norms and discourses, this moral economy approach conceptualises actors as social 
and sentient beings that are economically and psychologically dependent on others, 
possessing the capacity to develop throughout their life course complex needs and 
commitments to practices and people (Sayer, 2011).  
At the heart of Sayer’s ME approach is the concept of lay morality that refers to 
peoples’ on-going monitoring and evaluation of their own and others actions and faring in the 
context of their complex needs and understandings of what practices constitute well-being or, 
respectively, trigger suffering (Sayer, 2005). Yet, people’s agency and lay morality is 
‘constrained and enabled (…) by social structures and cultural discourses’ (Sayer, 2011: 86), 
so that socio-economic positions in general and wider inequalities of the political economy in 
particular limit, but do not colonise people’s agency and diverse needs and concerns (Sayer, 
2005). Here, Sayer identifies a tension between economic practices under capitalism and 
human needs and concerns. This is particularly inherent in capitalist organisations that aim to 
purify its practices and narrow employees’ needs and concerns to those that are essential for 
profit maximisation (Sayer, 2007). Yet,  Sayer argues that human needs and concerns tend to 
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spill over the instrumental frame of the employment relationship, which is visible in 
responses and social relationships that ‘may vary considerably in how far they conform to the 
organisation’s priorities’ (Sayer, 2006:206). 
Even though ME and LPT place their emphasis on different layers of analysis, both 
approaches share essential theoretical and ontological assumptions. At the heart of LPT and 
ME is the dialectical relationship between the separate and objective realm of capitalist 
relations and people’s agentic capacities that enables them to modify, resist, but also 
reinforce the materialist forces and normative pressures they are exposed to. In this way, both 
approaches are not deterministic, featuring a strong account of human agency that 
conceptualises employees as creative and will-full actors who react in different ways to the 
material realities of work and the employment relationship (Sayer, 2007; Thompson et al., 
2000). Following on from this, LPT and ME share a conceptualisation of organisations under 
capitalism as instrumental institutions that utilise labour as a means to the end of profit 
maximisation. Here, a shared understanding of labour as an exploitable resource emerges 
whose indeterminacy triggers a variety of different managerial practices that aim to control 
and capture it (Smith, 2006).  
 Meanwhile, LPT and ME complement each other in several ways. LPT adds to 
Sayer’s ME approach an in-depth understanding of changing employment and work practices 
in the context of wider dynamics in the political economy (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). 
Here, the social relations of production are conceptualised as contested, and LPT offers a 
strong conceptualisation of conflict and compromise at work that is based on the competing 
and under specific circumstances overlapping workplace concerns capital and labour have in 
the context of the structured asymmetry of employment. ME enhances an understanding of 
the relationship between employees and their managers as not only an economic relationship 
that is driven by workplace concerns, but also as a social and moral relationship. Here, the 
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relationship between employees and managers is conceptualised as being fused with peoples’ 
complex needs, moral evaluations and understandings as interdependent and sentient beings 
in the context of the structured antagonism of employment. In this way, Sayer’s ME adds a 
strong account of individual agency and moral dimensions of employment to LPT, enabling a 
focus on the different strands of workers’ and managers’ actions, experiences and 
relationships at work that are influenced but not determined by their position in the labour 
process (Sayer, 2007). Overall, this article argues that the theoretical lens of ME and LPT 
offers a rounder picture for analysing changes in work and employment and their social and 
relational consequences. 
 
Method 
The article draws on data from a wider research project conducted between 2010 and 2012 
which aims to capture employees’ and managers’ lived experience of the radically changing 
workplace regime in UK banks over the last three decades. Analysis is informed by data 
comprising 39 in-depth qualitative interviews with bank workers and managers from five 
retail banks in the UK. Overall, interviews lasted between one and three hours and 
culminated in 82 hours of interview material. Out of the thirty-nine interviewees, thirty-four 
were employed in a range of non-managerial positions, whilst five interviewees hold a 
managerial position in a bank. Based on this sample, three distinctive groups of bank 
employees and managers can be differentiated. One group consists of seventeen interviewees 
who entered the banking industry in the late 1970s and throughout the early 1980s; eleven 
individuals were interviewed who started their employment in the banking industry between 
the mid-1980s and early nineties. The final group of interviewees consists of eleven 
individuals who worked for a bank from the mid-nineties and early 2000s onward. 
11 
 
All five banks are leading national banks in the UK who dominated the financial market for 
large parts of the 20th century and continue to belong to the group of the most profitable 
clearing banks after the liberalisation of the financial industry and its financial crisis. 
Interviewees are almost equally spread across the five banks, with nine interviewees working 
for clearing bank 1-3 respectively, seven interviewees work for the fourth clearing bank. The 
remaining four interviewees were employed at the fifth bank. Even though differences in 
regards to corporate strategies, market share, total number of employees and branches exist 
between the leading national banks (Watson, 2004), previous research suggests that the 
banking industry is and has been traditionally homogenous when it comes to the organisation 
of work and management practices in branches (Halford et al., 1995). Indeed, as a reaction to 
the financial crisis, all banks involved in the study engaged in the post-crisis environment of 
labour cost-cutting, increased productivity expectations of their staff, and branch closures. 
All interviews were with consent digitally recorded and transcribed. The analysis of 
the empirical material rests on several cycles of analysis that included thematic manual 
coding and a categorisation of themes in ‘first-order’ and ‘higher-order’ codes, using 
NVIVO, a qualitative data analysis program. Thematic analysis was conducted to identify 
recurring themes in the narratives. Based on this process, first order codes were created that 
used labels to describe the lived experience of interviewees (‘close performance monitoring’; 
‘lack of discretion’; ‘conflict with supervisors’) that informed higher order codes which 
represent more abstract notions under which the first order codes were categorised together 
(‘managerial control’; ‘nature of work’; ‘relationships between workers and managers’). To 
guarantee anonymity, biographical and organisational details and names of all interviewees 
have been changed. 
At the heart of this article are narratives that reflect and make sense of their 
experiences of the labour process and its social relationships. However, narratives of the past 
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inevitably bear the problem that interviewees’ memory and recollection of events might be 
imprecise and clouded by nostalgia. Indeed it has been argued that narratives of the past  
reveal more about peoples’ contemporary situation rather than presenting an accurate picture 
of the past (Gabriel, 1993). While it cannot be ruled out that nostalgia plays a role for 
interviewees recollection of the labour process and its social relationships under the pre-PMS 
workplace regime, the narratives are neither uncritical of the pre-PMS labour process nor 
contradicting findings of previous research on the banking industry. Hence, even though 
recollections of past incidents bear the risk of being imprecise, they should not be devalued, 
as they offer a unique opportunity to reveal interviewees’ attachments to things that matter to 
them and their sense making of the present in the light of the past. 
 
Pre-PMS Branch work and its management  
Branch workers and managers who started work in the oligopoly banking industry in the late 
1970s and early 1980s describe their work with words such as ‘craft’, ‘professional’ and 
‘meaningful’. At the heart of these positive characterisations are shared control concerns of 
employees and managers that are embodied in a ‘whole-case’ working approach that rests on 
the following of work tasks until completion, the absence of pro-active frontline management 
and the prevalence of informal work-effort norms (Edwards et al, 2006). In this environment 
the role of BMs concentrated primarily on supporting bank clerks with work issues and 
allocating work tasks to teams and individuals. 
 
The branch manager was not looking over your shoulder and supervisors were not 
bothering you too much. You were expected to do your job well, but there was no 
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stick and no close monitoring. We knew when and how to process things. (Melissa, 
BW, started in 1980) 
 
In the context of a stable internal labour market that rewarded seniority and loyalty, 
BMs and their assistants were traditionally experienced bank clerks who were employed in a 
variety of clerical positions for a decade or two before reaching a managerial position. 
Despite BMs high level of accountability to senior management in regional centres, their 
work was characterised by relatively high levels of discretion in regards to the daily 
management of the labour process. 
 
Branch managers were encouraged to think of their branch as a mini-bank that they 
own. They were given leeway for deciding everyday business decisions and how to 
manage staff in a way they considered to be best for the branch and best for the 
employees. (Steve, BM, started in 1981) 
 
In the oligopolistic financial market, bank work featured privileged working 
conditions that triggered overlapping control and development concerns between BWs and 
BMs (Edwards et al., 2006). Yet, the relationships between BWs and BMs went beyond 
shared workplace interests, embodying a social and moral web that embedded the labour 
process. 
 
Pre-PMS social relationships between branch workers and their managers  
A pivotal theme in the narratives is the experience of a social structure of respect between 
BWs and BMs. Several narratives illustrate that BWs respect was grounded in the clerical 
and technical expertise BMs were believed to possess, but also the way BMs represented and 
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embodied the occupation and its social and moral order through clerical background and 
loyalty to the organisation.  
 
 
The branch manager was an outstanding member of the community. Back in the 
1970s and 1980s branch managers have been at the floor and went through clerical 
jobs before they reached a managerial position. We all had the utmost respect for him. 
(Diane, BW, started in 1979) 
 
The shared experiences of the labour process enabled BMs to relate and sympathise 
with the work branch staff performed and the struggles they were facing on a daily basis. The 
respect BWs received from BMs was encoded in the way they were trusted to do their job 
well, but also entailed traces of unconditional respect for the person occupying the job, 
enabling BWs to understand themselves as object of value (Sayer, 2006).  
 
‘Branch managers treated staff with respect. They did not look down on you. They 
valued you as a person. There was no condition of you outperforming everyone else 
to get recognition from management’. (Amanda, BW, started in 1986) 
 
Albeit it is not suggested that the social relationships between both groups 
undermined  the ubiquitous power asymmetries between capital and labour, narratives point 
towards the embeddedness of the labour process  in a social and moral web that rested on 
shared moral understandings. This is evident in BWs’ narratives that describe the experience 
of BMs concern for their faring not only as a factor of production, but also as a sentient 
individual (Sayer, 2011). 
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When my auntie died the manager took me aside and talked to me about it. He 
showed concern and was there for me. This was not about ‘when will you be 100% 
again for work’, but this was a human concern.  There was that sort of care and 
understanding of social and human problems. (Susan, BW, started in 1972, retired in 
2006) 
 
Yet, the labour process and its social relationships were interwoven with inequalities 
and power asymmetries that structured the employment relationship. Indeed, narratives 
suggest that patriarchal values were deeply ingrained in the workplace regime. This is evident 
in testimonials that reveal career structures and skill formation systems under the pre-PMS as 
fostering a ‘gender order’ (Crompton, 1989) that resulted in high levels of sexual division of 
labour and overt and covert discrimination against female bank workers.  
 
It was not common sense back then that we would do the same training as our male 
colleagues. But getting banking certificates would give you the edge. So [they made] 
it a hassle for us to get into these classes. But let us not forget that discriminative 
practices, like marriage bars, are recent history in banks. Branch and assistant 
managers were usually recruited form the old boys club (Hazel, BW, started in 1989).  
  
The marketisation of branch work and the rise of PMSs 
The nature of bank work changed radically throughout the early 1990s when waves of 
organisational restructuring re-designed bank branches as retail units in which work became 
predominantly sales driven. The proliferation of marketing and sales tasks was experienced 
by BWs as a degradation of their formerly conservative and service oriented clerical 
16 
 
occupation that is manifest in  cynical descriptions that characterised bank work as 
‘increasing, towards customers wallets’ (Mick, BW, started in 1984) and being primarily 
about ‘hunting customers’  (Brent, BW, started in 1986).The heightening of pro-active sales 
work was accompanied by a Taylorisation of bank work that is encoded in the 
implementation of PMSs that rested on time and motion measurements from which team and 
individual performance targets were derived. BWs experienced a decline of task discretion 
thanks to the integration of sophisticated ICTs that were used to standardise work processes 
and the division of formerly interdependent work tasks into small sets of measurable jobs that 
became subject to close monitoring by supervisors.  
 
We felt that the switch to measuring performance was very fast and over the top. 
They tried to capture every single thing that we do here. No stone was left unturned. 
Corporate management developed measurements for every job and task they could 
think of. (Judith, BW, started in 1975) 
 
In the context of intensified competition in the financial market individualised 
performance and output norms for BWs replaced the formerly informal work effort norms 
and became increasingly demanding in the late 2000s, peaking in observations of BWs that 
the required performance was unachievable. The escalation of performance targets went hand 
in hand with the introduction of disciplinary policies that threatened employees who did not 
meet their targets with punitive practices, which ranged from formal warnings to involuntary 
exit. In this way, job security was directly linked to BWs ability to meet performance norms, 
pointing towards a ‘collectivisation of effort and decollectivisation of risk’ (Burchell et al., 
1999: 60).  
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Targets are going up for the last few years. (…) It is hard to meet targets all the time, 
especially in the current economic climate. Many have been labelled in the past as 
underperformers. The real threat is to be labelled as underperformer twice within a 
year as management tries to push underperformers out the door. (Bob, BW, started in 
1996) 
 
Within the changing labour process of branch work, branch management experienced 
a significant degradation of their discretion for managing staff, while their role in the branch 
transformed radically.  
 
 
The transformation of branch management: From paternalism to 
monitoring and disciplining 
 
Under the performance driven regime performance targets were designed and cascaded down 
by senior managers in regional centres with little to no involvement of BMs. The erosion of 
the formerly high levels of discretion BMs experienced in the context of the implementation 
of a centralised PMS s that requires them to engage in prescribed and repetitive forms of 
micro-managing and disciplining staff suggests that the degradation of the work and role of  
BWs and BMs in the labour process have much in common. 
 
 
My work consists of collecting sales statistics, following procedures, passing on 
targets to teams and individuals, applying disciplinary policies and so on. It is called 
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management, but it is really just ticking the box and pushing employees, executing 
decisions that have been made elsewhere. (Hans, BM, started in 1995) 
 
The degradation of BMs autonomy and authority went together with the tightened 
control over their work via the implementation of accountability measures, encapsulated in 
detailed performance targets and close monitoring by senior management. Unsurprisingly, 
common themes in the narratives are experiences of powerlessness and vulnerability vis-à-vis 
a system that places pressure on BMs from above and below. In this environment, BMs 
translated performance pressures into tighter control over branch staff, resulting in a 
disconnection of the formerly shared control and development concerns between BMs and 
BWs and a decline of shared moral understandings (Edwards et al., 2006; Sayer, 2006). 
 
I need to constantly animate, push and stretch staff so that the branch meets its target, 
because if the branch does not hit its target it is not just staffs head on the line but 
mine as well. Not just employees are walking on eggshells, management is too. 
(Danny, BM, started in 1990) 
 
 
The rise of antagonistic relationships between branch workers and 
managers under PMS 
 
With the rise of PMSs and the marketisation of the employment relationship, low-trust and 
conflict ridden engagements between branch management and employees increased 
significantly, shaping everyday interactional realities. Low-trust relationships were enmeshed 
in BWs perception of BMs as the personalisation of a system that subordinates them under 
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the dictate of performance expectations. At the heart of these sentiments are BWs’ 
evaluations of the PMS as a workplace regime that treats employees as factors of production, 
narrowing their multiple interests and concerns down to those that are essential for meeting 
market demands (Sayer, 2006). 
 
Branch managers became supervisors and glorified sales managers. They are doing 
less things now, they are just there to drive sales. For them it is all about pushing us as 
hard as possible to achieve the targets. There is little room for care for human 
problems. (Jenny, BW, started in 1976 and retired 2011) 
 
The dominance of conflict-ridden relationships between both groups is particular 
evident in the hostile attitude of experienced BWs towards a new generation BMs who were 
recruited from outside the banking industry and possessed limited experience of bank work. 
BWs hostility is encoded in dismissive descriptions of BMs as ‘clueless’, ‘useless’ and 
‘tools’, exemplifying the shift of a social structure of respect to antagonistic and dehumanised 
relationships. In turn, BMs who were recruited under the PMS regime tended to align their 
interests with the PMS mantra, embracing the instrumental and market driven nature of bank 
work. 
 
We need to create profit for shareholders and hit the targets. That is why I am here 
and that is why they [branch workers] are here as well. If you create value you 
deserve more money than someone who is pushing papers and selling standardised 
products. (Ken, BM, started in 2004) 
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The conditionality and disconnection between BWs and BMs fed a vicious circle of 
distrust, disrespect and self-survival that deprives actors of human connections and spaces for 
care and sympathy (Sayer, 2007). Narratives illustrate that both groups engaged in a negative 
framing process of the respective other as possessing hostile and harmful intentions, 
triggering dehumanised and often personalised conflicts that include but go beyond 
managerial abuse and open displays of disrespect.  
 
I complained recently about one specific manager and the manager actually said to me 
“if you are having a go at me, I am going to have a go at you”. That is the way they 
think. (Rory, BW, started in 1996) 
 
Staff and managers pick on each other a lot lately. It is very difficult to go to work 
sometimes because of the pressure and disrespectful practices, like sending emails in 
capital letters, shouting at each other. (Diane, BW, started in 1979) 
 
Against the backdrop of degradation of work and measurement of targets and 
application of disciplinary policies that took precedence, narratives display a strong concern 
about a labour process that objectifies and deprives them of recognition, trust and 
empowerment, leaving little space for human connection. 
 
Traces of reconnection  
Even though conflict was a pivotal feature of the labour process, some testimonials suggest 
that temporary re-connections between BMs and BWs occurred over their shared assessment 
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of and moral outrage at a workplace regime that renders people powerless while violating lay 
notions of fairness and justice (Sayer, 2011).  
 
In the appraisal meeting my manager asked ‘how do you see yourself developing at 
work?’ and I told him ‘this work prevents me from developing’. I am lucky because 
my manager is cool with me, he is not a robot. Once I told him: ‘The company is full 
of shit, it treats the customer like trash and takes as much money as they can get and 
treats us like shit as well’. He just nodded and said ‘I know’. He knows what is going 
on and he doesn’t mind talking about how things really are. I am safe with him. (John, 
BW, started in 1982) 
 
However, shared moral understandings between both groups were rare thanks to the 
instalment of a new generation of BMs as target and disciplinary policies enforcing 
supervisors who were recruited on the basis of their support for the PMS. Nevertheless, the 
case of Ciara suggests that peoples’ shared experiences from outside the labour process can 
enable them to search for ways to improve and re-humanise the employment relationship. 
Being active in the union before becoming a BM, Ciara experienced compassion for the 
pressure employees faced. After fighting senior management over targets she deemed 
impossible to meet while facing staff shortage, she told senior management ‘that they have to 
send someone to run this branch because I am going home’ (Ciara, former BM, started in 
1998). Ciara stopped working in the branch shortly after this incident. Yet, her concern 
regarding the faring of her fellow workers was not limited to the grievance she aired and 
decision to exit the organisation, but is also at the heart of her current work as a development 
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officer. In that capacity, she offers union-led workplace training, supporting BWs to gain a 
voice in the labour process.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The utilisation of Sayer’s ME approach in tandem with LPT offers a novel framework that 
connects the theoretical strands of changing practices in work and employment against the 
backdrop of political economy as a structural context that fosters a structured antagonism 
between labour and capital fuelled by the indeterminacy of labour and capitalists aim to 
control it (Edwards, 1979; Smith, 2006) with a strong account of people as reflective, 
interdependent and lay moral actors who have complex needs and concerns (Sayer, 2006; 
2011). Bringing LPT and ME together allows a conceptualisation of relationships between 
employees and managers as a multi-layered and dynamic control, social and moral 
relationship. The combination of these two analytical strands theorises social relations at 
work as suffused with people’s lay morality and normative understandings on the one hand 
while being shaped by the constraints and enablers workplace regimes hold for the competing 
rationales between capital and labour and human (dis)connection on the other (Edwards et al., 
2006; Sayer, 2008). Such a focus allows an analysis of if and how the instrumental frame and 
material reality of the labour process is mediated and humanised, or reinforced and 
intensified, by employees’ and managers’ relationships. The changing labour process and 
relationships between employees and managers in UK banks in the context of the 
marketisation of the employment relationship and the implementation of PMSs showcases 
how the combination of LPT and ME provide a valuable theoretical approach for analysing 
the social, relational and moral consequences of work and employment. 
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In the context of the relatively privileged employment conditions in UK banks under 
the pre-PMS workplace regime, the article reveals that the labour process was embedded in a 
social compromise between capital and labour and shared moral understandings (Edwards et 
al., 2006). This is encoded in  overlapping control and development concerns between BWs 
and BMs and a lay morality that rendered the respective other not only as an economic, but 
also as social and sentient being with diverse needs and concerns, resulting in displays of 
respect, recognition and care (Sayer, 2005). Even though open conflicts were largely absent 
in the pre-PMS workplace regimes, the LPT and ME lens adds nuance to an understanding of 
how struggle and conflict at work bubbled under the surface of the employment relationship. 
Conflict between people’s lay morality and the inequalities of the pre-PMS workplace regime 
is inherent in the persistence of patriarchy in banks that rendered female branch workers 
inferior to their male colleagues. However the co-existence of discriminative practices with 
shared moral understandings does not imply a corruption of moral sentiments in workplaces. 
Instead, it illustrates the complexity of social and moral relationships between dominant and 
subordinated groups that rest on moral understandings that are unevenly accomplished and 
thereby selective and fallible (Sayer, 2000, 2011). Hence, a social and moral web at work 
cannot be interpreted as a countermovement to the power and control relationships that are 
structured within workplace regimes under capitalism, but rather as a dynamic and 
conditional moral understandings within the structured asymmetry of the employment 
relationship that represent selective attempts to humanise it. 
The article reveals the degradation and intensification of work BWs and BMs are 
subject to under PMSs that is embodied in detailed performance targets, close work effort 
monitoring and ‘harsh’ disciplinary policies. The theoretical lens of LPT and ME provides an 
enhanced understanding of the market driven conditionality of the performance driven 
workplace regime that embraces a risk shift from the employer to the employee via an 
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individualisation of risks and rewards (Thompson, 2011). A striking feature of BWs’ and 
BMs’ labour process is their experience of relative powerlessness vis-à-vis ever increasing 
performance targets and the ubiquitous threat of dismissal. In this way, the combination of 
the focus of LPT on changing workplace practices with Sayer’s thick conceptualisation of 
people as social and moral beings illustrates the employment relationship in banks as 
degraded and highly commodified labour process that narrows down BWs and BMs complex 
needs and concerns to those essential for meeting market needs (Edwards et al., 2006; Sayer, 
2007). The article argues that the precedence of a market logic in the labour process has 
disruptive consequences for human engagement and social relationships, as testimonials of 
rising levels of self-protective and competitive behaviour in the branch suggests. 
However, the relationships between BMs and BWs go beyond competitiveness and 
instrumentalism, featuring expressions of hostility and overt conflict between both groups. 
The combination of ME and LPT suggests that the shift towards conflict-ridden relationships 
in banks can be interpreted in two complementary ways that showcase the strength of the 
theoretical lens. First, the rise of antagonistic relationships are ingrained in the competing 
control and development concerns of labour and capital that are translated into the branch and 
everyday interaction realities (Edwards et al., 2006). In this way, open conflicts at work are 
driven by disagreements between BWs and BMs over the nature of work, the quality and 
quantity of targets and the application of disciplinary policies (Bélanger and Edwards, 2007). 
Conflict over workplace conditions are particularly evident in the hostile relationships 
between experienced BWs and the new generation of BMs who were placed as constrained 
supervisors in the labour process and recruited on the basis of their acceptance of the PMS 
mantra. Thus, it can be argued that conflict is structured within the employment relationship. 
Following on from this, the conceptualisation of the relationship between employees 
and managers as control, but also social and moral relationship enables an understanding of 
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how the conflict over workplace concerns escalates towards hostile forms of engagements 
and often personalised conflicts. In the context of the marketised labour process that 
embraces self-survival and instrumental engagements with work and relationships, narratives 
provide ample evidence that the relational give and take that is essential for human and moral 
connections is undermined. The dismantling of the social and moral web was experienced by 
BWs as a violation of their moral understandings, as their evaluation of the labour process as 
resting on an unfettered commodification of their labour that has little regard for human 
wellbeing and social concerns shows (Sayer, 2007). BWs’ moral evaluations are informed by 
their experiences of the valued pre-PMS workplace regime and the shared moral 
understandings if fostered.  However, the new generation of branch managers who lack the 
shared experiences of the pre-PMS labour process tend to accept the market driven 
conditionality of the labour process, while evaluating BWs’ sense of injustice as a sign of 
their inadaptability to the changing employment conditions.  In this way, the antagonistic and 
hostile relationships at work are fuelled by fundamentally different moral understandings 
regarding the nature and meaning of work and how employees and managers should treat 
each other (Sayer, 2006). The disconnection of moral understandings leads to a 
personalisation of the conflict over workplace concerns, resulting in hostile relationships, ill-
treatment and, ultimately, a decline of well-being. This is manifest in narratives that portray 
the respective other as having competing and indeed hostile intentions, while expressing 
concern of not being treated as an individual but rather as an object. However, this article 
does not suggest that human re-connection is impossible between BWs and BMs, as the 
example of Ciara suggest, but evidence implies that opportunities for shared moral 
understandings are limited.  
In conclusion, this article contributes to the critical workplace studies on the changing 
nature of white collar employment (e.g. Carter et al., 2014; Hassard et al., 2009; Halford et 
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al., 1995), providing an-in-depth account of the radically changing labour process in UK 
banks and its consequences for the social relationships between BMs and BWs. Drawing on 
in-depth interviews with branch workers and managers, the novel framework of LPT and ME 
captures the shift from a labour process that featured shared workplaces concerns and moral 
understandings between employees and their managers to a performance driven and 
individualised employment relationship in which competing workplace concerns and 
disconnected moral understandings contribute to hostile and conflict-ridden relationships 
between both groups. By arguing that the PMS driven workplace regime prioritises market 
needs over human needs and strips many of the human and social texture out of the 
workplace, an ample warning is provided regarding the impact a purely target and marketised 
workplace regime has on people and, ultimately, the society. 
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